斯蒂芬·罗奇：供应链问题短期难解，美联储需积极调整政策利率以应对货币贬值

来真是，招致American目在此以前事与愿违商品风能危机的诱因确有愈演愈烈了推移？其当中暴露单单哪些深层基本关键性问题？

起先：与本轮风能危机最具可比性的是末70上世纪的事与愿违商品风能危机。末70上世纪的事与愿违商品风能危机招致了非常轻微的通涨，不仅冲击到American，还震荡了当今全球政治经济。

末70上世纪是我政治经济学术研究职业生涯的西端，以前我学院刚刚前就读于，进入监管机构文书工作，想起了它对政治经济情形的轻微误判。当此的风能危机与下半年完全相同，但有一定的相似性，即单价在短短时间急剧上升。末70上世纪到80上世纪初，我们也亲身经历了轻微的通涨。但完全相同之处在于，那时还不发挥发挥作用当今全球事与愿违商品，而如今，事与愿违商品已然踏入了当在此以前风能危机当中的一个关键性各种因素。因此，我们在开展非常时要合理考虑这一点，才能准确研判当在此以前政治经济战局、找到应对之策。

1970上世纪，在授意副主席亚瑟·陶德（Arthur Burns）的他组织下，监管机构对战局的研判有罪了一系列不对误，将以前的配给震荡误判为则才会的、“是一种特殊情形”。

末70上世纪配给风能危机的导火索是1973年末的阿拉伯油井禁运令，此举使得当今全球油价滚了四倍。以前，我所在的部门碰巧统筹受控这个事情件对American政治经济的冲击。陶德对我们真是：“把风能单价从CPI中的这两项，风能回事和通货税制不想非常大的关系。”我们告状了。几个同月后，愈演愈烈了军粮震荡，军粮单价上升，陶德把我们叫到他筹公室，对我们真是：“我挖掘出军粮过后增长主要是因为厄尔尼诺现像。受到厄尔尼诺现像的震荡，家庭在秘鲁海岸的鲭鱼数量急剧增大，而鲭鱼是American头、猪饲料的关键性性原料。厄尔尼诺现像远大于我们的遏制范围，我真的通货税制无需要用单单补救。把军粮单价也从CPI中的才对吧。”

以前，我们是坚决的，我们说道不可把军粮和风能从CPI当中才对。但是陶德真是：“你们不才对，那我就不须找情愿这么要用的人了。”我们又想失业，所以无奈地告状了，也由此偶然间创建了最早的核心CPI基准。陶德很恼火。几周的几个同月当中，二手小车、住房、珠宝、娃娃、移动房屋等各类商家的单价纷纷先于始涨，陶德没用我们把越远来越远多的工程建设从CPI中的才对，到了1975上半年，我们非常少才对了60%左右的工程建设，但残存的依然在上升。直到那时，他才承认愈演愈烈了轻微的通涨。

我讲这个剧情情，是因为如今的监管机构面对单价的涨——最初是木材，在此之后侵入风能、新小车、二手小车等——第一反应将也是问到这是则才会的，是SARS这一特殊事情件所加剧的一次性事情件。一年在此以前，系统设计性可能会显露出端倪，监管机构真是这些现像都是则才会的，我以前就提单单了非议。

如今，布朗总算承认他不对了，问到通涨不是则才会的，通货税制并不需要要用单单补救。（编者注：11同月30日，监管机构副主席布朗在American参议院金融委员才会要用证名词举出时，冷漠转“黑豹”，他问到“是时候弃用通涨‘则才会’这个名词了”。）我称赞他承认不对误的勇气。American财短、监管机构原副主席耶伦最近也刊发了相同的言论。

这是一个关键性性的转变，总结了联储对通货税制的之后审视。联储此在此以前对通涨的意见——即粮食价格涨只是SARS加剧的则才会关键性问题，不并不需要无视通货税制控制措施——是不对误的。；也相反，当在此以前的通涨并不需要尽快无视通货税制开展补救，监管机构总算认识到这一点，我对此问到称赞。

至于这看似的基本关键性问题，我们还是要从过剩过多来深入学术研究。事情在此之后看，不对挖掘出，只有政治经济增速较较差的时候，配给端才能撑得住。以在此以前事与愿违商品非常凸显效率，不一定短期正处于紧张的情况下，欠缺稳定性。2008年当今全球保险业风能危机之后，我们的涨冲击非常较为缓更慢；如果这次后SARS崛起也非常平缓，事与愿违商品就能撑得住，也就不才会有轻微的通涨关键性问题了。只不过，这次的冲击实在强于劲了。

SARS屏蔽复职后政治经济涨的急剧冲击远大于了很多人——之外我自己——的预料，非常少有人能明白崛起步伐如此得益于。监管机构当然也不想预料到，也正因如此才无视了非常保守派的大规模通货诱发税制。事情后回想，这种方法的关键性问题在于，通货税制诱发、大规模扩表、急剧将债券降到零等税制的精准度；也被SARS撤除翻转了。如今回头来看，我们挖掘出了这个关键性问题，但以前是意识将近的。

SARS屏蔽这样一来政治经济涨大部分才会大部分停顿，而政治经济哪怕只是部分先于始开展时（越远来越远不须真是大部分开展时），都才会招致了急剧涨，而在这个时候渐变大规模的通货税制诱发，就才会加剧总效益爆炸固定式涨，从而有利于加剧配给端本就早就发挥发挥作用的冲击。

事与愿违商品关键性问题短短时间困难重重

预见需愈发侧重稳定性、打单单余量

3、却是不光是American，苏格兰、西欧等其他东欧国家和内陆地区目在此以前也陷入事与愿违商品关键性问题。其他内陆地区陷入的事与愿违商品关键性问题和American确有完全相同？在您却是，这轮当今全球事与愿违商品风能危机的木栅点主要愈演愈烈在哪些环节？

起先：西欧、苏格兰陷入与American完全相同的挑战并不是出人意料，这几个政治宏观经济都归功于当今全球价值链下产出及被装的当今全球互相配合。与American一样，西欧和苏格兰在复职SARS屏蔽后，也亲身经历了急剧的政治经济崛起——当然，苏格兰的崛起步伐非常越远来越远强于劲，但两者都亲身经历了与American完全相同的过剩不对配。

此外，它们总效益的结构与American很像，撤除后，总效益的涨值得注意主要最主要越远来越远轻消费品教育领域。事情实上，撤除后的这段时在在中的，越远来越远轻消费品效益涨的速度远远远大于了以在此以前。

数同月在此以前我曾就此寄给过一篇撰文“Hitting the Limits of Pent-Up Demand”。我从学术研究生中期就先于始学术研究越远来越远轻消费品。我们一般用存货微调仿真（stock adjustment models）来深入学术研究越远来越远轻消费品的趋向于。这个仿真总结单单一个事情实，即越远来越远轻消费品的炮管很短，如果你短短时间付钱很多，那么几周不一定就不才会独自购付钱，因为短短时间取而代之并不需要。我们不才会不停地付钱新小车，小车都是先于几年再继续换，饰品、电工也是如此。所以，越远来越远轻消费品单价的行情远大于了我们的预计。

当欧美消费品效益的冲击就不像American、苏格兰、西欧等一样那么最主要越远来越远轻消费品，这不实在可能也是当欧美的CPI单价冲击较差于这几个政治宏观经济的诱因。

几周写书一下当今全球事与愿违商品的主要难题。通过事与愿违商品在当今全球的总体布局，我们将完全相同内陆地区产出的零组件聚集在独自，事与愿违在当欧美或其他亚洲各国完成被装。当今全球事与愿违商品平稳试运行的简而言之高效的城市交通系统设计。目在此以前，当今全球事与愿违商品陷入的一大难题是保险业业。当在此以前，大连港运输能力根本无法符合基本效益；American的港湾吞吐能力也过更慢效益，西岸相非常明显，东部海岸和西北部海岸也有完全相同情形；西欧陷入值得注意的关键性问题。抬轿特别，货小车运输是另一个难题，我们并未足够的的士。

因此，只有当城市交通系统设计试运行平稳比较最简单时，事与愿违商品才能合理发挥发挥作用。但如今我们要用将近这一点。

当然，集成电路配给配给也是一个关键性性的难题，这对之外汽小车和电工在内的所有含的电子零组件的精密商品的制造都招致了了巨大震荡。

4、事与愿违商品风能危机将对当今全球政治经济招致怎样的冲击？如何补救这些不实在可能的冲击？

起先：从前20年来，当今全球事与愿违商品亲身经历了短足发展。我难以或许预见几年我们对当今全球事与愿违商品的依赖离地才会增大。当在此以前全球，各国彼此间联结在独自，所以我们应将致力于较好地管理这个现代化的全球。

当今全球保险业风能危机的在此以前几年在在，我们确有有罪了轻微的税制不对误。但当在此以前我们陷入的是两场百年不遇的大流行病，新冠SARS招致的震荡不可最简单肇因税制定立，相非常是政治经济税制定立的不对误。预见很短一段时在在内，SARS才会以多种方固定式则与我们相一致，虽然我不是微生物学家，但这早就是一个协商。奥密克戎变异病毒性的单单现，再继续一次无论如何新冠病毒极好的感染力。

当在此以前，基于当今全球价值链的当今全球政治经济网络发挥发挥作用上述诸多危险性，如何补救这些关键性问题是我们陷入的关键性性挑战。为此，毫无疑问、税制定立与史家并不需要之后认知价值链在当在此以前彼此间联结的当今全球政治经济当中所扮演的角色、以及如何较好地管理它。

5、您预计事与愿违商品风能危机才会过后多久？如何应对当今全球陷入的事与愿违商品风能危机？

起先：我们要认清现实：当在此以前的事与愿违商品关键性问题不是短短时间可以应对的。转变事与愿违商品并不需要耗时大量的时在在。Tim Cook在担任苹果公司CEO之在此以前曾统筹苹果的事与愿违商品建设。为彼此间结合产出手机电脑的高效事与愿违商品，他花了15年的时在在。

学术研究表明，事与愿违商品的粘附非常强于，不才会轻易推移，转变事与愿违商品绝非易事情。有很多革命家鼓吹产出迁建（reshoring），指单单我们大部分不并不需要事与愿违商品，把所有产出都从离岸开发设计迁至欧美东欧国家即可。但这个过程并不需要很短的时在在，不是简最简单单真是筹就筹的。

5个同月在此以前，拜登中央政府发布了一份关于补救事与愿违商品关键性问题的短篇简报，其当中提单单了很多具建设性的促请，之外巩固配给能力建设与工人专业训练、强化交通系统设计等，但并未任何一条促请是可以并能见效的，所以不该妄想可以通过筹组一个文书工作小组就能想单单急剧应对事与愿违商品难题的筹法。这个关键性问题短短时间是未能应对的。

认知从前，我指单单我们过于凸显事与愿违商品的效率了。从2008年当今全球保险业风能危机以来，我们就进入了更慢涨的中期。事情实上，在保险业风能危机在此以前几年，涨就早就先于始下调。我们早就习惯了更慢涨。我们从前有罪的一个不对误就是指单单在这种更慢涨周边环境下，事与愿违商品不并不需要实在多稳定性，不须为效益的短期急剧涨留单单显然。

因此，预见当今全球事与愿违商品的建设并不需要愈发侧重稳定性，打单单余量。当然，这是有代价的，因为对于大众和民营企业来真是，事与愿违商品下市场需求利用的越远合理，效率就越远较差，就能以越远来越远较差的单价购付钱零组件和商家，而如果为完全相同于未来会单单现的这种效益短期急剧涨的情形留单单缓冲的显然，就才会增大当今全球事与愿违商品短期以来带给我们的“效率额度”。

总而言之，此次事与愿违商品震荡带给我们的一个自已是，当今全球事与愿违商品始终以来欠缺稳定性，因此也就欠缺敏捷。预见我们并不需要愈发十分重视这个关键性问题。

通涨冲击至少延续到本年

监管机构并不需要通过微调债券补救通涨

6、American通涨基准在10同月末刷新新纪录。事与愿违商品关键性问题在非常大离地更早高了通涨？您如何是非几周的通涨行情？

起先：事与愿违商品难题是通涨急剧上升的应将当不合理条件。我指单单，通涨至少本年、甚至在越远来越远短一段时在在内才会远高于监管机构2%的目标低水平。监管机构应将越远来越远尽力地补救通涨冲击。

我寄给了一系列撰文非议监管机构补救通涨的方固定式则。面对通涨冲击全面过后上升，缩表并不是直接的补救物件。

缩表对于保险业资产外的事情项究竟有何种冲击是一个备受争论的关键性问题。几周，监管机构应将将信息化放在增大总效益增速上，为此，就并不需要抬高确有债券低水平。结合未来会的CPI数据来看，这两项通涨冲击后的合众国Fund债券较差至-6%，我察看了历史背景数据，挖掘出合众国Fund债券上一次跌落跌到是在末70上世纪，但那时也只跌到了-5%。如果真是那个时候监管机构酿成大不对，那么如今也许正在重蹈覆辙。监管机构并不需要越远来越远尽力地通过微调税制债券来补救通涨，而不可只靠缩表。

7、American劳工人口为120人数据显示，10同月末平均时薪累计涨4.9%，通胀回升4.6%。一些人指单单，过后的报酬涨是通涨的主要驱动各种因素之一，罗宾逊曲线早就“呼唤”，从前四个季度的斜率比 COVID-19 结束在此以前的十年明显斜坡。你同意这个论点吗？

起先：我不实在已确定就业效率上升确有是招致本轮通涨冲击的诱因。不过，如果报酬通涨独自沿着当在此以前的一个点发展，就业效率确有才会在越远来越远多离地更早高通涨。目在此以前，American的通胀急剧增大，单单现了在此以极大的大规模离职汕尾，管理人员纷纷辞职、跳槽，许多关键性从业者陷入轻微的就业配给，而这无疑才会减小效率冲击，从而有利于加剧SARS招致的单价震荡。

8、报酬涨对通涨的冲击是不再的，还是才会对American通涨预计招致了过后冲击？您指单单值得离地注意吗？监管机构才会相应将微调通货税制吗？

起先：监管机构非常十分重视报酬与通涨之在在的的关系，才会信息化考虑基于流动性微调后的报酬低水平或者真是单位劳动效率。

因为如果报酬涨与流动性涨相一致，那就不是关键性问题。但事情实上，从前15年以来，流动性涨始终困扰着American。SARS推波助澜了一些新模固定式，如线上交写书等，这些背离才会在一定离地上促进流动性涨，但在通胀暴跌、大规模离职汕尾加剧就业配给增大、从而招致报酬低水平上升的背景下，新模固定式招致了的涨并根本无法金融市场这些各种因素招致了的负面冲击。

所以，监管机构确有应将该十分重视就业市场和SARS加剧的过剩过多两者之在在的的关系。但不管是单价冲击从则才会、偶发性的关键性问题演变踏入各种各种因素、大规模的关键性问题，还是通胀急剧下滑加剧报酬冲击上升，都指向同一个路径，都允许监管机构在严格控制通货税制时越远来越远有健全。

American当在此以前的通货税制恰当极度了。考虑当在此以前的通涨低水平以及就业效率上升的速度，监管机构不应将该独自把挂名合众国Fund债券依靠在零，如果不开展微调，这才会是一个不小的税制不对误。

9、如果Omicron大规模结束对政治经济招致有利于反制，从前American决策者的税制空在在还有非常大？

起先：如果奥密克戎传染性极强于、且我们现有的疫苗对其坚决接受，那么American政治经济乃至当今全球政治经济都无论如何才会之后遭受沉重反制。这是比如说的情形。

未来会，奥密克戎早就招致市场担忧。目在此以前，精神病学家对奥密克戎的了解尚为不合理，基本预计是它的后果不才会实在大，但如果这一预测单单现正确，奥密克戎对政治经济招致新一轮大的震荡，我们的税制物件才会非常局限。

假如奥密克戎变异病毒性加剧政治经济涨急剧下调，那么通涨冲击才会获取一定离地的缓解。我不已确定奥密克戎才会招致了非常大的后果，从我所了解的个人信息来看，它也许不才会像新冠刚刚前结束时加剧那么无可避免的政治经济活动外周，甚至不实在可能还并未VL变异病毒性的冲击大。但如今还不可下定论。

当在此以前，监管机构的资产负债表已壮大极度，税制债券为零，American税务赤字达致历史背景新纪录——我们当然也可以独自印钞、国际通货Fund组织可以独自对国际保险业注入流动性，也可以再继续推单单新先于支计划，但债券早就在相当一段短的时在在中的停留在零的低水平。在此背景下，无视这些控制措施才会招致了我们未能尽力补救的短期后果。

如果SARS取而代之对总效益组合而成大规模的震荡，即使政治经济涨一定离地上下调（比如当欧美就是这样的），总效益还是才会正处于高位，而招致通涨的是总效益与总配给之在在的非常过多。当欧美的通涨冲击却是并未American、西欧等地这么轻微。American的通涨冲击确有非常大，我们的CPI累计涨如今早就高达6%。

通涨上升时，难以将债券依靠在零低水平。这也才会招致越远来越远深层次的关键性问题，即这种周边环境下，能非常大规模施行有利于税务诱发。因此，一言以蔽之，我们的税制空在在非常局限。

直译通鉴

1． According to recent news reports， many ports in the United States have experienced congestion， containers are piled up， and supermarkets are out of stock． When did supply chains in the US start to encounter such problems？

Stephen Roach：19 months ago I wrote an article in the Financial Times titled ‘A 1970s-style stagflation is one broken supply chain away．’ That was 19 months ago， and the supply chain has clearly broken．

The fracture in the global supply chains was， in retrospect， something we could have seen． Heading into the pandemic， supply chains were already stretched to the maximum． There was very little slack built into global value chains． So， it wouldn’t take much to cause a break， and the break came not from the supply chain itself， but from the enormous bounce-back in post-lockdown aggregate demand that occurred in the spring of 2020．

So， it was an accident waiting to happen； it’s one that I had worried about well before the current problems have now arisen． The big surprise to me came from the explosive bounce back in aggregate demand， and the supply chains gave way very quickly in the summer of 2020． The situation has gone from bad to worse since then．

In essence， it was a shaky， fragile supply side that was coming into sharp conflict with an extraordinary bounce back post-lockdown in global demand for goods．

2.What factors do you think have caused the current imbalance between supply and demand？ In fact， shortly after the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic， supply shortages already surfaced． In your opinion， is the cause of the current supply chain crisis different from that of the previous round？ What are the structural problems behind？

Stephen Roach：To me the most relevant previous example is the supply disruptions of the early 1970s． That set the stage for a very， very serious inflation problem in the United States and around the world． I had just come out of the graduate school and started working then as an economist at the US Federal Reserve． The Federal Reserve under the chairmanship of Arthur Burns made a series of major analytical mistakes in dismissing supply shocks as transitory and as one of ‘special developments．’

It started with the quadrupling of world oil prices after the Arab oil embargo of late 1973． At the time， I was working with the research team at the Fed that was charged with monitoring the impacts of these disruptions on the US economy． Chairman Burns said： “Take out the energy component of the CPI， because it does not really relate to monetary policy．” So， we did that． And then a few months later， there was a food shock， with soaring food prices， and Arthur Burns called us into his office and said： “I’ve figured out that this is due to El Niño weather effects that are having an adverse impact on anchovies， a fish of the coast of Peru， that goes into the creation of feedstocks， the food for cattle and pork in the United States． I don’t think monetary policy should respond to El Niño weather effects that are beyond our control． So， take that out of the CPI as well．”

At that point， we objected． We told the Fed Chairman， you can’t take food and energy out． He said， if you don’t do it， I will find somebody who will． So we didn’t want to lose our jobs， and we did that． Unwittingly，we created the first core CPI． We took food and energy out and Burns was pleased． A few months later， he had a problem with used cars， home ownership， women’s jewelry， children’s toys， mobile homes， and he kept asking us to take more and more out of the CPI until finally in early 1975 we have taken maybe 60% out of the CPI， and the remainder was still going up far too sharply． Only at that point， did Burns concede that there was a serious inflation problem．

I tell you the story because the first response of today’s Federal Reserve is to view the current outbreak of sharp price increases - initially in lumber and then in energy and cars （both new and used） – as transitory， temporary — one-off developments， reflecting Covid． I was very critical of that interpretation when a year ago the Fed dismissed these problems when they first became evident．

Chairman Powell has finally conceded that he was wrong． He no longer believes that these are transitory developments that should not be addressed by monetary policy． I commend him for admitting this mistake． Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen， former Chair of the Fed， has said the same thing in front of the U.S． Congress very recently．

This is an important development and represents a major rethinking of monetary policy． The initial response of the central bank to call these now pervasive price increases temporary or transitory due purely to a Covid-related shock is wrong． The inflation we are seeing right now has actionable consequences for monetary policies that need to be addressed sooner rather than later． I commend the Fed for finally coming around to that point of view．

Regarding the structural issues， it is important to go back to the supply-demand imbalance． We now know， with the benefit of a hindsight， that supply was adequate only for a low-growth economy． Supply chains stress efficiencies， they don’t have a lot of slack built into them． What happened was we didn’t get a slow-growth rebound as we did in the aftermath of the global financial crisis． If we had a slow-growth recovery this time as we did in the aftermath of the global financial crisis， the supply side would have held， and we would not have had this inflation problem． But we didn’t get that．

Again， I’ll go back to the extraordinary rapid rebound in the economy in the aftermath of the lockdown． Many， including myself， did not think that the economy would come back as sharply as it did． The Federal Reserve certainly did not， which is why they were very aggressive in providing monetary stimulus． The problem with that approach is that the combination of extraordinary monetary stimulus — sharp expansion of the balance sheet while cutting interest rates immediately to zero again — was reinforced by the end of the lockdown．

A lockdown basically shuts down your economy． You saw that in China with a record decline in GDP in Q1， 2020， but when you go from a complete lockdown to just a partial reopening， that’s a big surge in economic growth． If the central bank is providing aggressive monetary stimulus at a time of surging economic growth refelecting the end of the lockdown， then you get an explosive growth in aggregate demand． That then exacerbates the pre-existing problems on the supply side that I warned of 19 months ago．

3． Freight costs tracked by the Baltic Exchange Dry index have fallen by about one-third in the past month． Moreover， the US government has asked the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach to operate 24/7． Do you think the supply chain crisis will be resolved soon？ Or， how long do you expect the crisis to last？

Stephen Roach：I don’t think it’s going to be resolved soon． If economic growth slows a lot because of this new Omicron variant of Covid， then we will see some moderation of inflationary pressures． I don’t know the full extent of the new variant， but from everything I’ve read， it’s not likely to exact a sharp curtailment in economic activity like the first wave of Covid-19 did or even the echo effects of the Delta variant． But that remains to be seen． It’s hard to know if that’s going to occur．

If there are no Covid-related major disruptions to aggregate demand， then even if economic growth slows somewhat – you’ve already seen a slowing in China – the level of aggregate demand is still very high， and it’s the level of aggregate demand relative to the level of aggregate supply that is out of balance in causing the current outbreak of inflationary pressures． It’s interesting that you haven’t seen nearly as much of that in China as has been the case in the United States and in Europe and elsewhere around the world． But it’s clearly a problem here with our CPI now running slightly above a 6% y-o-y rate．

4． The US inflation hit a 20-year high in October． To what extent have supply chain difficulties pushed up inflation？ How do you see the inflation trend？

Stephen Roach：I’ve already covered that． The fragile supply chain is a necessary but not sufficient condition for this rapid inflation． I think inflation is going to stay well above the Fed’s 2 percent target for easily the next year， and possibly longer． In my opinion， that requires the Fed to be much more aggressive in going after inflationary pressures than it initially signaled would be the case．

I’ve written and followed up with a series of articles arguing that the Fed has the wrong approach to deal with this inflation． It’s addressing what it now admits belatedly as inflation surprise by tapering its balance sheet． I think that’s an ineffective tool to deal with an outbreak of pervasive and enduring inflationary pressures．

It’s very debatable as to what type of impact the balance sheet has on anything other than financial assets． The Fed should be focused on slowing the growth rate of aggregate demand， and it needs increases in real interest rates to do that． Based on the latest CPI， the Federal funds rate adjusted for inflation is -6%． I went back and looked at the lowest the real Federal funds rate was in the early 1970s and it was -5%． If the Fed made a huge mistake back then， it now risks making a comparable mistake today． It needs to be much more aggressive in dealing with inflation through the policy rate， rather than the balance sheet．

5． According to the U.S． Bureau of Labor Statistics， in October， the average hourly earnings rose 4.9% year-on-year， and the unemployment rate fell to 4.6%． Some think that the ongoing wage hike is among the main drivers of inflation， and the Phillips curve has been “awakened” with its slope in the past four quarters significantly steeper than in the decade before COVID-19 broke out． Do you share this view？

Stephen Roach：I hesitate to say that the current inflationary outbreak is driven by a surge in labor cost． If wage inflation continues at this current higher rate， then it’s quite possible that the labor cost’s contribution to inflation will increase． With the sharply falling unemployment rate and unprecedentedly large number of workers dropping out of the labor force， changing jobs， and resigning their positions， there are significant labor shortages in many key industries， and that certainly can lead to more pervasive cost pressures that would exacerbate those Covid-related price shocks that we’ve seen thus far．

6． Is wage inflation transitory， or will it have sustained impact on US inflation expectations？ Do you think it’s worth heightened attention？ Will the Fed adjust its monetary policies in response？

Stephen Roach：The Fed is very mindful of the linkage between wages and inflation， and they would add in – as would I – that the key is to focus on productivity-adjusted compensation， or unit labor costs．

Because if wages are going up at the same pace as productivity， then it’s really not a problem． But productivity has been a problem in the U.S． for the last 15 years． Yes， we have new ways of doing things today — like the zoom interview we are currently conducting — that might be contributing to faster productivity growth． But these developments are not pervasive enough to offset the surging wages that are coming from sharply plunging unemployment rate and the massive resignations that have reduced the supply of labor．

So， the Fed is correct in focusing on the interplay between the labor market and Covid-related supply-demand imbalances that we addressed earlier． But the bottom line is whether it’s the price shocks that have gone from temporary and sporadic to more enduring and pervasive， or whether it’s the wage pressures as an outgrowth of the sharply falling unemployment rate， they are all pointing in the same direction． That reinforces the need for the Fed to be more disciplined in tightening monetary policy．

Our monetary policy is far too easy right now． We should not be running a nominal federal funds rate that is zero when inflation is as high as it is and when labor costs are rising as rapidly as they are． If that continues， that will be a major policy mistake．

7． Other countries and regions such as the UK and Europe are also having supply chain issues． Are their problems the same as those faced by the US？ What are the choke points in global supply chains？

Stephen Roach：It’s not a coincidence that we’ve seen similar impacts in Europe and the UK． They benefit in a similar way from the global dispersion of production and assembly through global value chains． They’ve also experienced fairly rapid post-lockdown recoveries – less so for Europe than the U.K． but they have a similar post-lockdown mismatch between supply and demand that has been evident in the U.S．

Moreover， their composition of aggregate demand is very similar to that of the U.S． where the post-lockdown bounce-back in aggregate demand has been concentrated in consumer durable goods， which have literally gone up far more rapidly in this post-lockdown period than has ever been the case in the past．

I wrote an article about this several months ago （“Hitting the Limits of Pent-Up Demand” in February 2021）． I’ve studied consumer durables ever since I was in graduate school． The models we have long used to understand the behavior of consumer durables are called stock-adjustment models． They reflect the fact that durable goods last for a long period of time， and when you buy a lot of them in a short period of time， then you usually don’t buy many more over the succeeding period because you just don’t need to do that． You don’t need to keep buying a new car， for example． You drive your car for several years until it wears out and then you buy a new one． The same with appliances or furniture in your house， etc． So， we’ve been surprised by the ongoing surge of long-lasting durable goods．

To a large extent， the rebound in demand in China has been less focused on durable consumer goods than is the case in the US， the UK and Europe． Maybe that’s why your CPI price pressures are less of a problem than ours．

On the choke points in global supply chains． Imagine a global supply chain which draws together components from all over the world and assembles them in factories in China and East Asia． The key ingredient you need and the key process for it to run smoothly is a very efficient transportation system． The big choke point globally has been on the shipping end where we don’t have enough capacity in our container shipping industry to satisfy the aggregate demand． In particular， we don’t have enough slack in the port facilities in the U.S． especially in the west coast but also south and to some extent the east coast． The same is true of Europe and the UK． For the land-based transportation， the trucking industry is also another choke point． We don’t have enough drivers．

So， the supply chains work best when the transportation system functions smoothly and seamlessly． And they are not doing that now．

And， of course， there is also a major choke point in semiconductors， with a lack of supply． That’s had a major impact on virtually all sophisticated goods with electronic components， from motor vehicles to appliances．

8． In your opinion， how can the above-mentioned difficulties be addressed / how to solve the supply chain crisis facing the world？

Stephen Roach：The reality of the supply chain dilemma is that there is no easy quick fix． It takes a lot of time to alter supply chains． I have studied supply chains very carefully． In his former capacity at Apple before he became CEO， Tim Cook was in charge of Apple’s supply chain． It took him 15 years to create this very efficient extraordinary supply chain that produces iPhones and computers．

Research shows that supply chains are very sticky， which means they don’t change easily． It’s very hard to alter them． There have been a lot political commentary saying we don’t need supply chain， just bring everything back home． This is the argument for moving from offshoring to what has been called reshoring， bringing back the offshore production． It’s not that easy to do． It’s going to take a lot of time．

The Biden administration， 5 months ago， released a large report on addressing American supply chain problems． They offered a lot of constructive actions， building more capacity， training workers， improving our transportation system， but none of these recommendations can be implemented quickly． So， the idea that we can assemble a taskforce and come up with a quick recipe to address the supply chain is probably a mistake． We’re going to be living this for quite some time．

As I look back on this period， I think we went much too far with the efficiency benefits of supply chains． We’ve been in a slow-growth period since the GFC． Growth was relatively slow in the years before that， too． So， we’ve gotten used to slow growth． When you have a slow-growth environment， you can run your supply chains in a very tight way． You don’t have to allow for major surges in demand． That was a mistake we made．

In the future， we need to build more slack in the global supply chain． This will be costly， because the benefits to consumers and businesses are that very tightly-run supply chains cut costs and allow you to purchase components and goods at a cheaper price． So if you build in a contingency buffer to guard against the types of demand surges that we’ve seen recently， that will cut into the efficiency dividend that we’ve gotten accustomed to from global supply chains．

The lesson here is we do not have enough slack built into our global supply chains， and we don’t have enough flexibility as a result． We need to think about that key consideration more carefully in the years ahead．

9． How will the supply chain crisis affect the global economy？ And how to deal with the potential effects？

Stephen Roach：The world has clearly come a long way in embracing global value chains in the last 20 years． It’s very difficult for me to think that we are going to move away from global value/supply chains in the years ahead． The world is very tightly integrated， so we’ve got to come up with a better way to run this integrated world．

We made big mistakes in the years before the global financial crisis， but you can hardly blame policymakers at least the economic policymakers for a once-in-a-hundred-years pandemic． That’s a pretty extraordinary shock which will be with us in one form or another for probably some time to come． I’m not an epidemiologist， but that’s the standard view． The latest Omicron variant is just another indication of the staying power of the virus．

The global economy faces some major challenges in addressing these types of problems that underscore fragility to its network of interdependencies as underpinned by global value chains． This will send a lot of strategists， policymakers and researchers back to the drawing board to rethink the role of value chains in an interdependent world and how to manage them better going forward．

10． In case of a massive outbreak of Omicron dealing further blows to the economy， how much room is there left for U.S． policymakers to respond？

Stephen Roach：On the worst-case basis， if Omicron becomes a very serious variant that is highly transmissible and is not responsive to the extraordinary vaccines we have， that’ll be a major blow to the U.S． and the global economy． There’s no question about that．

The market over the last several days has been somewhat worried about that． The experts right now don’t know a lot about it， and they are hopeful that it’s not going be that disastrous． But in the event that they are wrong， we certainly don’t have much policy ammunition to deal with another major shock．

The balance sheet of the Federal Reserve has expanded too excessively， the policy interest rates are at zero， our fiscal deficits are at record settings． We could continue to print money and the central bank can continue to inject liquidity in the financial markets， and we could embark on another spending program． But there are long-term consequences of doing that that we have yet to address， mainly because interest rates have been held at zero for so long．

In a period where inflation is moving up， I think that’s a very challenging period to maintain interest rates at the zero bound． That raises even deeper questions about the potential extent of further fiscal stimulus in this environment．

So， the short answer is we don’t have too much ammunition left．

Additional comment：

I’m struck by the comparisons with the early 1970s， because that’s when I started working at the Fed as a professional economist and watched the way the Fed made serious mistakes in diagnosing the problem． The current situation is different． There are a lot of similarities in terms of the sudden outbreak of price pressures． But one thing important to know is that while we had horrible inflation problem in the ‘70s and early ‘80s， that inflation outbreak came before we had supply chains． Supply chains were not a factor back then， and they are now． That adds a different wrinkle to the comparison that’s important to think about in diagnosing the source of the problem and the potential cure for it． But this is not the 1970s， but there are some similarities that we need to mindful of． And there are some differences like I just eluded to that we need to carefully think about as well．

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